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sant à approfondir : quel rôle des individus engagés dans une production de type
industriel, touchant un quasi salaire, ont ils défini pour leurs activités agricoles.
Comment voyaient-ils la relation entre ces deux secteurs? Le livre nen dit mot, et
tend à traiter lagriculture comme un vestige voué à une disparition rapide. Les
théories marxistes le veulent ainsi, mais est-ce ce qui sest vraiment passé? Les petits
propriétaires sont eux aussi occultés par un « point aveugle » théorique. Ils sont
supposés disparaître, une minorité rejoignant les rangs des possédants, et la majorité,
celle des prolétaires. Dupuy décrit les mécanismes par lesquels cette double ab-
sorption peut avoir lieu. Mais à quel rythme sest-elle produite? Dans quelle propor-
tion? Comment ces petits propriétaires-gemmeurs ont-ils tenté de survivre en tant que
producteurs indépendants? Étaient-ils nécessairement voués à léchec?
Ces quelques réserves mises à part, louvrage reste une importante contribution
à notre compréhension de léconomie et de la société du Sud Ouest français, et à
celle des transformations du monde rural en général.
Béatrice Craig
Université d’Ottawa
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Few periods in French history have occasioned more controversy than the years
1940 to 1945. In this short space of time, France witnessed crushing military defeat
and German occupation; the creation of a new French state based at Vichy, whose
leaders attempted to carry out a domestic National Revolution while pursuing a
policy of collaboration with the German occupiers; and the emergence of a Resis-
tance movement whose diverse members worked to oust the Germans and, for the
most part, the Vichyites from French soil. How French institutions, political for-
mations, and individuals related to these events and to the memory subsequently
constructed of them has recently been a source of considerable interest to historians
of France. During the 1980s and 1990s, in fact, there has been a veritable explosion
of studies examining both the history of these years and the processes by which the
actors  including former president François Mitterand  managed the memory
of their past. One of the many virtues of the second edition of John Hellmans
excellent The Knight-Monks of Vichy France is its important contributions both to
Vichy historiography and to the history of memory.
Hellmans book examines a group of prominent Catholic intellectuals and ac-
tivists and their wartime attempts to implement a new vision of France, one that
prized community and the community-oriented personne over the individual, the
spiritual over the material, and authority, discipline, and virility over the presumed
decadence and general flabbiness of the Third Republic. This effort to remake
France occurred primarily at the École Nationale des Cadres d’Uriage, which was
established in 1940 to train youth elites, and much of the book examines the
founding, operation, and demise of the school. Using a range of archival materials
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and printed sources, Hellman analyses the intellectual synthesis which emerged at
Uriage out of ideas from the Old Right, the New Catholic Left, and 1930s non-
conformism, and he examines the curriculum established to train successive groups
of stagiaires in these ideas. At the school, which was located in an imposing
medieval château in the Alps near Grenoble, the uniformed students  who only
very rarely came from the peasantry or the working class and were always male 
followed a regime which combined rigorous physical training, religious worship and
contemplation, manual labour, study, and communal evening gatherings in front of
the châteaus massive fireplace. This attempt to form new leaders emphasized
discipline, hierarchy, submission to leadership (in the persons of both Uriages
Vieux Chef Pierre Dunoyer de Segonzac and Marshal Pétain himself), self-sacrifice,
community, spirituality, and virility. (In this highly masculinized male community,
even the young women employed at the school ate by themselves and were not to
come into contact with the instructors.)
Hellman makes the nature of Uriages relationship to Vichy central to his study.
Taking issue with many earlier historical treatments of these men and their school,
he argues that the Uriage experience was central to Vichys National Revolution
and that its intellectual synthesis was the Vichy ideology. To make his case, he
marshals considerable evidence. He discusses, for example, how the school viewed
itself as an avant-garde laboratory for the National Revolution, how it demanded
loyalty to Pétain from its students, and how, for a time, it enjoyed considerable
support from the Vichy government. He also cites numerous proclamations of
loyalty to Pétain and to the National Revolution on the part of the Vieux Chef. If
Hellman situates Uriage at the centre of Vichys National Revolution, however, he
also points out how Uriages particular brand of communitarian spiritual revolution
(not to mention its ambitions) soon came under criticism from a range of forces
within Vichy. The school was closed at the end of 1942.
Following closure, the knight-monks of Uriage reconstituted themselves as an
order and continued spreading their message. Hellman details how they formed
themselves into flying squads which swooped down into the mountains and at-
tempted to initiate young résistants into their brand of renewal. For the men of
Uriage, this undertaking proved terribly exciting, a kind of mystical mountaintop
male brotherhood forged against the backdrop of war. For many on the receiving end,
however, the effort was often tainted by the schools prior association with Vichy.
As the military tide turned against Germany and increasing numbers of French men
and women embraced armed resistance, many of the men of Uriage moved gradually
in that direction. As Hellman is clear to point out, however, their priorities remained
distinctive. Even as D-Day approached in 1944, the men of Uriage remained less
concerned with expelling the Germans and the Milice from France through armed
struggle than with laying the groundwork for postwar renovation and their central
role within it. Indeed, while others gathered arms in 1944, they prepared to place
themselves in positions to influence the postwar situation. This they did remarkably
well. Through their involvement in new training schools, social and cultural move-
ments in newly liberated areas, and in Parisian journalism and publishing, these men
quickly carved out roles as central figures in the postwar cultural and intellectual
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landscape. For example, Emmanuel Mounier, who had been an important intellectual
influence at Uriage, emerged at the head of a relaunched Esprit, while Uriages
director of studies, Hubert Beuve-Méry, became the head of the new Le Monde,
arguably Frances most important postwar newspaper.
That these men were able to position themselves so successfully in postwar
France depended, at least in part, on their ability to reconstruct their wartime pasts.
At the end of the book, Hellman gives a fascinating account of the process by
which these prominent men managed the memory of their past. He describes, for
instance, how Mounier rewrote the history of both Esprit and the associated
philosophy of personalism in a way that situated them on the political left and laid
claim to excellent Resistance credentials. This set the stage, Hellman argues, for
further memory management regarding both Esprit and the Uriage experiment
more broadly. Through such actions as careful control over access to archival
material, encouragement of sympathetic historical treatments, and denunciation of
those with opposing views, the men associated with Uriage helped construct a past
that downplayed certain aspects of their ideas, erased their central involvement with
Vichy, and exaggerated their Resistance credentials. For Hellman, this effort to
manage history is less understandable  and less forgivable  than the mens
own wartime actions.
Were the history of the knight-monks of Uriage merely one isolated example
it would be interesting enough, but what makes Hellmans study all the more
important is that this groups intellectual and political journey and subsequent
memory management represent a path taken by many other Catholics of this
generation, including François Mitterand. As Hellman points out in the second
edition, we now know that Mitterands trajectory  from right-wing student ac-
tivism in the 1930s, to support for Pétains National Revolution in the early 1940s,
to engagement in the Resistance, to subsequent postwar political prominence 
paralleled that of the men of Uriage. By tracing the knight-monks history, Hellman
thus provides an important contribution to ongoing debates about the complicated
relationship many French people had to the events of 19401945. As his study
suggests, there were few Catholics in France who wholeheartedly supported either
Vichy or the Resistance, and it was often only careful memory management that
made it appear so in retrospect. By highlighting these complexities and by unmas-
king the politics of postwar memory and forgetfulness, Hellman makes a significant
contribution to questions of central interest to historians of contemporary France.
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London in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has attracted the attention of
many able scholars in the past 30 to 40 years. Ian Archer and E. S. Rappoport have
